Efficient Data Perturbation for Privacy Preserving and Accurate Data
  Stream Mining by Chamikara, M. A. P. et al.
Efficient Data Perturbation for Privacy Preserving and Accurate Data
Stream Mining
M.A.P. Chamikaraa,b,∗, P. Bertoka, D. Liub, S. Camtepeb, I. Khalila
aRMIT University, Australia
bCSIRO Data61, Australia
Abstract
The widespread use of the Internet of Things (IoT) has raised many concerns, including the protection
of private information. Existing privacy preservation methods cannot provide a good balance between
data utility and privacy, and also have problems with efficiency and scalability. This paper proposes an
efficient data stream perturbation method (named as P 2RoCAl). P 2RoCAl offers better data utility
than similar methods: classification accuracies of P 2RoCAl perturbed data streams are very close to
those of the original data streams. P 2RoCAl also provides higher resilience against data reconstruction
attacks.
Keywords: Privacy, privacy preserving data mining, data streams, Internet of Things (IoT), Web of
Things (WoT), sensor data streams, big data.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming widely popular as it connects typical day to day devices
such as kitchen appliances, cars, washing machines, headphones, wearables, etc. to the Internet to al-
low life activities to be more intelligent, efficient and reliable [1]. IoT devices can forward a significant
amount of data in streams from various sensors via long-lasting connections. IoT has revolutionized
many fields including health-care, wellbeing applications, social life, environment monitoring, trans-
portation, and energy. The availability of low-cost pervasive sensing devices has enabled IoT to grow
in an ever-increasing manner, and IoT sensor streams have become a vital source of big data [1, 2].
The vast diversity of IoT devices introduces many challenges [3], among which the most important
ones are (i) effective data collection, (ii) efficient data processing, and (iii) privacy protection and
security [4]. The availability and increased accessibility of IoT sensors often introduce the risk of privacy
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breach for individuals. Pervasive data collection, such as crowd sensing applications, may involve
sensitive personal information including lifestyle, habits and personal preferences, and accessibility to
such information by a third-party may raise privacy concerns [5]. It is important to share IoT streams
(or big data in general) so that authorized third parties can make valuable decisions, but information
extracted from these streams should not be linkable to individuals.
Disclosure control of microdata refers to the process of applying different privacy-preserving mech-
anisms to the data before releasing them for analysis [6]. Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM)
has been widely investigated for big data, and similar approaches to IoT streams are now emerging.
Privacy-preserving methods are struggling to achieve higher accuracy [7], and the exponential growth
in IoT-sourced data streams adds another layer of difficulties [8]. The popular PPDM techniques are
either not scalable or not efficient enough to deal with this, and privacy preservation of data streams
is still a significant challenge. Technological advancements in data storage have eased the burden of
storing large chunks of data generated by a variety of sources [9]. In addition to the issues posed by
big data, IoT faces the problem of efficient data processing, as the devices are most often resource con-
strained. Therefore, the efficiency of privacy preservation techniques is essential. The unpredictability
and diversity of data streams form a challenging environment for privacy-preserving algorithms that
want to achieve high accuracy.
Data perturbation is a privacy preservation technique that alters the values of data elements in
a database to maintain individual record confidentiality [10]. Among PPDM techniques, data per-
turbation is relatively simple. Additive perturbation [11], [12], random rotation [13], geometric per-
turbation [14], microaggregation [15] and condensation [16] are some of the existing perturbation
methods. Privacy preservation of IoT data streams presents several additional challenges, as the data
is released incrementally, endlessly, and its fast nature hinders the possibility of using historical in-
formation. Differential privacy (DP) has attracted attention due to the level of privacy guarantee it
provides [17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. DP is a privacy model, similar to k − anonymity [22], l − diversity [23],
which defines a strong privacy guarantee over data. But deploying methods to achieve DP over data
streams is challenging due to the limit of privacy budget offered by it [24]. Prominent attempts of
privacy preservation of data streams include anonymization [25], randomization, microaggregation and
data condensation [7, 26]. However, these methods have not been able to balance privacy and accuracy
effectively: when one is preserved, the other seems to suffer.
The main contribution of this paper is an efficient and secure algorithm that can be used for
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perturbing high-speed data streams such as those produced by IoT devices. Fast execution with
predictable execution time guarantees the capability of working with continuously growing big data.
The method first conducts homogeneous group formation (based on tuple distances) and uses group
properties to generate a rotation matrix to perform rotation perturbation upon each group. The
efficiency of the proposed method was proven by testing it on generic datasets retrieved from the UCI
data repository 1. Classification accuracy of the perturbed datasets was also proven by using different
classification algorithms. The results indicate that the proposed method is very effective in privacy-
preserving data stream classification. The proposed algorithm’s privacy protection was demonstrated
against several, often-used attack methods, including naive estimation [7], known I/O [7] attacks and
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) [7]. A comparison with random rotation perturbation [13] and
data condensation [14] indicated the proposed method’s superiority in both classification accuracy and
data privacy. Clear advantages of the proposed scheme in efficiency, accuracy and data privacy make it
an excellent solution for data streams demanding on-line processing in resource limited environments.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 provides a literature
review on the existing related methods. Section 3 provides the methodology employed by P 2RoCAl
along with its variations. Section 4 presents the results produced by P 2RoCAl in the sense of classifi-
cation accuracy, attack resilience, time complexity, and scalability. A comprehensive discussion on the
results is provided under Section 5 with some future directions. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
IoT enables the interaction of heterogeneous information systems to deliver important, diversified
services to users. IoT devices are used in many domains such as health-care, smart cities, and wear-
ables [1]. The explosive growth of IoT has produced a vulnerable medium that may leak sensitive
data to unwanted third parties. IoT often includes wireless sensor networks to collect and process
data, hence generates incremental data streams that eventually result in big data. IoT often brings up
many security and privacy issues such as confidentiality, authentication and authorization [2]. But, it
is also important that authorized third parties be able to retrieve IoT stream data and big data, e.g.
to generate valuable insights using data mining techniques. Different attempts in the literature tried
to impose privacy on IoT data, such as controlling access over authentication [27], Attribute-Based
1https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
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Encryption [28], temporal and location-based access control [27] and employing constraint-based pro-
tocols [29] are a few examples of such methods. Yabo Xu et al. have adapted Naive Bayesian Classifier
for private data streams, but their method is not suitable for generic data stream classification [30].
Feifei Li et al. derived a method to efficiently and effectively track the correlation and autocorre-
lation structure of multivariate streams and leverage it to add noise to preserve privacy. However,
the method is vulnerable to principal component analysis-based attacks [31]. Josep Domingo-Ferrer
et al. proposed a method named Steered Microaggregation that can be used to anonymize a data
stream to achieve k-anonymity. But the problem of information leak inherent to k-anonymity over
high dimensional data can be a shortcoming of the method [26]. Aggarwal C.C. et al. proposed a
condensation based privacy-preserving method for data mining. The method is scalable and efficient,
but its ability to maintain a good balance between privacy and utility is questionable. When the
method parameters are set to achieve high accuracy (using small spatial locality), the privacy of the
data often suffers [32]. Condensation can be considered as a descendant of microaggregation which
follows a similar mechanism of homogeneous group formation. Both microaggregation and condensa-
tion use the concept of within-group homogeneity. The main difference between them is that, while
in microaggregation a single central tendency measure is used, condensation uses a covariance matrix
based mechanism [16, 15].
Privacy can have different meanings and definitions. From our perspective, privacy can be consid-
ered as “Controlled Information Release” [33]. The advancements in data mining and dissemination
methods increased the demand for preservation of privacy [34]. As a result, privacy preservation be-
came an important prerequisite of any data mining system, and literature shows many attempts to
address the related issues [35]. Privacy-preserving techniques can be classified as data distribution
scenarios (centralized or distributed), data modification methods (perturbation, encryption, general-
ization, etc.), data mining algorithms, and data or rule hiding methods [34]. Data perturbation comes
under data modification methods, where the data are subjected to modification using different ap-
proaches such as noise addition [11], microaggregation [15] and randomization. Perturbation attracted
attention due to its relative simplicity and efficiency compared to other PPDM methods [35]. Data
perturbation methods can be classified into input perturbation and output perturbation. The latter
is based on the concepts of noise addition and rule hiding while the former is performed either by the
addition of noise [11] or multiplication by noise [36]. Input perturbation can be divided further into
unidimensional perturbation and multidimensional perturbation [37, 38, 36, 39]. Additive perturba-
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tion [11], randomized response [40], and swapping [41] are types of unidimensional input perturbation;
microaggregation possesses both unidimensional and multidimensional perturbation capabilities [15],
whereas condensation [16], random rotation [13], geometric perturbation [14], random projection [36],
and hybrid perturbation are types of multidimensional perturbation [35].
A privacy model should identify the limits of private information protection/disclosure [42]. Earlier
privacy models, such as k−anonymity [22], l−diversity [23], (α, k)−anonymity [43], t−closeness [44]
show vulnerability to different attacks, e.g. minimality [45], composition [46] and foreground knowl-
edge [47] attacks. Later, it was proven that many of these models face challenges in regards to the
curse of dimensionality [48, 25]. For example in the cases of big data and data streams, the methods
that try to satisfy these privacy models tend to have higher privacy leak [48]. Differential privacy (DP)
is another privacy model that provides a strong privacy guarantee. Global differential privacy (GDP)
and local differential privacy (LDP) are the two models that can be used to achieve DP over data.
GDP is based on output perturbation where the method and amount of data perturbation are deter-
mined based on the query outputs. GDP is also called the trusted curator model, where the analyst
would only be able to run queries on the database whereas in local differential privacy (LDP) input
perturbation (e.g. using randomized response [49]) is applied to facilitate full/ partial data release.
In LDP the analysts can run their analysis directly upon the perturbed data [50, 51], e.g. increasing
information content via injection of additional noise to minimize privacy leakage [52]. However, GDP
and LDP show poor performance for small datasets, as accurate estimation of the statistics shows poor
results over heavily noisy data. Furthermore, existing LDP algorithms involve a significant amount
of noise addition/ randomization on input data, resulting in a lower level of utility for data streams.
As the data stream’s lifespan extends, the GDP and LDP processes will have to be restarted when
the privacy budget is reached. This drastically reduces the utility of DP in the perspective of data
streams [24]. Utility and privacy often appear as conflicting factors, and improved privacy is frequently
accompanied by reduced utility [53].
The most relevant to the approach we propose are two perturbation methods: data condensation
and rotation perturbation. In data condensation, the data are divided into multiple homogeneous
groups of predefined size in such a way that the difference between the records in a particular group is
minimal, and a certain level of statistical information about different records is maintained. Then the
sanitized data are generated using the uniform random distribution based on the eigenvectors which are
generated using the eigendecomposition of the characteristic covariance matrices of each homogeneous
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group [16]. Although condensation is a good contender among privacy preservation algorithms, in
some instances the condensation approach fails to provide enough privacy, especially when the spatial
locality of subgroups are small, which can be a characteristic feature of data streams. On the other
hand, when spatial locality is large, the quality of the dataset drastically reduces [14], and hence the
accuracy decreases. Random rotation perturbation is a matrix multiplicative [54] data perturbation
method, in which the original data matrix is multiplied using a random rotation matrix that has
the properties of an orthogonal matrix. The application of rotation is iterated until the algorithm
converges at the desired privacy level [13]. Due to the isometric nature of transformations, random
rotation perturbation is capable of preserving the distances between the tuples in the original datasets
[13], and therefore it provides high utility towards classification and clustering. However, due to the
recursive nature of random data generation, this method consumes an extensive amount of computer
resources, making it difficult to work with extensively large datasets.
Literature shows many attack methods that can be used to re-identify individuals in a sanitized
database. It has been noted that different methods are vulnerable to different types of attacks. There
are many types of attack methods such as principal component analysis [55], maximum likelihood
estimation [56], known I/O attack [7], ICA attack [57] and known sample attack [7]. These attacks
basically try to regenerate the original dataset. For example, additive perturbation can be attacked
using different data/noise reconstruction algorithms that are based on concepts such as principal com-
ponent analysis [58], maximum likelihood estimation [58]. Multiplicative data perturbation methods
can be exploited using known input/output (I/O) attacks, known sample attacks, and ICA attacks.
Many of the previously proposed privacy preservation methods, including data perturbation, per-
form poorly when high dimensional datasets are introduced. Even when the performance is good
for low dimensional data, as the number of attributes and number of instances increase, the amount
of necessary computer resources increase exponentially [23, 13, 14]. This is often called “the curse of
dimensionality”, and not only makes the perturbation process extensive, it also provides extra informa-
tion to attackers. The higher the dimensions in the datasets, the easier attackers can use background
knowledge to determine the identity of individuals [48].
Literature shows a paucity of efficient privacy preservation methods scalable enough to handle the
exponentially growing databases and data streams such as IoT stream data. It can also be noted that
the existing methods have problems with utility, level of uncertainty, and low level of resilience. A new
data stream perturbation method that is scalable, efficient, and robust would overcome the existing
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issues of the past PPDM methods and provide a solution towards large-scale privacy-preserving data
stream and big data mining.
3. Method
This section provides a comprehensive description of the proposed method named as P 2RoCAl:
Privacy-Preserving Rotation based Condensation Algorithm. P 2RoCAl is a privacy preservation al-
gorithm for data streams and big data. It uses the properties of data condensation and rotation
perturbation and combines their qualities, the efficiency of condensation and accuracy of rotation per-
turbation. P 2RoCAl is designed to perturb data before the storage phase in the general purpose data
flow of IoT data streams as depicted in Figure 1. That is, the stored data has already gone through
the privacy preservation process of P 2RoCAl.
Figure 1: Application of P 2RoCAl in the general purpose data flow of IoT data streams.
P 2RoCAl initially clusters the data into multiple homogeneous groups (grouping and clustering will
be used interchangeably throughout the paper with the same meaning). Data processing for privacy
preservation is then imposed on the fixed-size data chunks that are dynamically maintained. Next,
the covariance matrix of each group is generated using group statistics. After that, the covariance
matrices are used to generate the corresponding geometric rotational groups. The rotated groups are
then merged, and the tuples are randomly shuffled and released. The main steps of the proposed
algorithm are presented in Figure 2 and Algorithm 2. The initial data grouping process can be
conducted using Algorithm 1. Parameter k (number of groups/clusters) or k′ (number of tuples
in a group/cluster) in Algorithm 1 is accepted as a user input prior to the data grouping process.
After accepting the input dataset D and the initial k or k′, the clustering/grouping of the dataset D is
conducted using Algorithm 1. Here each group/cluster is considered to be a condensed group containing
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the records {X1, X2, ..., X ′k}. Next, we generate the covariance matrix C(Gi) that corresponds to each
group/cluster. In order to do so, we need to maintain the following information as characterized by
data condensation [16].
• For each attribute, the sum of corresponding values.
• For each pair of attributes, the sum of the product of corresponding attribute values.
Algorithm 1 Data clustering/grouping process
Inputs :
D ← original dataset with m tuples and n attributes
k ← number of groups/clusters (flag = 1)
or
k′ ← number of tuples/instances in one cluster/group (flag = 0)
Outputs:
G ← homogeneous groups
1: if k > n or k′ < 2 then
2: stop
3: end if
4: if flag == 1 then
5: conduct k-means clustering on the dataset to form the k number of groups (G1, G2, .., Gk)
6: else if flag == 0 then
7: i=1
8: repeat
9: randomly sample a tuple (Xi) from D
10: select the closest k′ − 1 and Xi from D to form a cluster, Gi
11: remove the selected k′ tuples from D
12: i=i+1
13: until D is empty
14: end if
End Algorithm
After generating each covariance matrix, the eigenvectors of each covariance matrix are determined
by decomposing C(Gi) according to Equation 1. Here, the columns of P (Gi) represent the eigenvectors
of covariance matrix C(Gi). Since the matrix is positive semi-definite, the corresponding eigenvectors
form an orthonormal axis system. Hence, the resulting matrix of eigenvectors (P (Gi)) of a particular
covariance matrix, which corresponds to a homogeneous group, has the properties of an orthogonal
matrix where columns and rows are orthonormal. Therefore, P (Gi) preserves the relationship P (Gi)×
P (Gi)
T = P (Gi)
T × P (Gi) = I where P (Gi)T is the transpose matrix of P (Gi) and I is the identity
matrix. This implies that P (Gi) of a particular homogeneous group has all the properties of a rotation
matrix. It was also proven that the resulting matrix is still an orthonormal matrix, although the order
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of the rows or the columns of the orthonormal matrix is changed [14]. Hence the column-permuted
matrix of the resulting rotation matrix will also behave as a rotation matrix. This property was next
used to randomize the process of rotation perturbation by generating randomized matrix RP (Gi) by
a random column shuffle of P (Gi).
C(Gi) = P (Gi)×∆(Gi)× P (Gi)T (1)
9
Accept the dataset (with m tuples and n attributes) to be sanitized
Accept the input value for k or k′
Conduct the clustering process
according to Algorithm 1
Generate covariance matrices of each group C(Gi)
Determine the eigenvectors of each covariance matrix by decomposing
C(Gi) in the following form: C(Gi) = P (Gi)×∆(Gi)× P (Gi)T
Generate RP (Gi) using random column shuffle
Multiply the records in each group
using the corresponding RP (Gi) of that group
Merge the rotated groups
Shuffle the tuples of the dataset
Release the final dataset
Figure 2: Perturbation algorithm for a static database
3.1. Algorithm for static datasets
Algorithm 2 and the Figure 2 show how the perturbation is conducted on a static dataset where
the whole dataset is fed to the algorithm once. At the end of the group rotations, the rotated groups
will be merged, and the tuples will be randomly swapped (shuffled) to increase randomness in the final
dataset to improve data privacy. Flag values of Algorithm 2 represent the two configuration selections
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for the two types of clustering/grouping possible. If the user provides k (number of groups/clusters) as
the input value, flag will be set to 1, and the grouping will be conducted using k −means clustering
as fixed in Algorithm 1. If k′ (number of tuples in a group/cluster) is selected as the input, flag will
be set to 0 (which is the default setting). The grouping is done using the random clustering process as
fixed in Algorithm 1 under the setting of flag = 0. In case of group size of only one tuple, the rotation
will be applied according to the configurations of the closest previous group with more than one tuple.
This step is used to increase the effect of perturbation, as for a group of one tuple, the result can be a
rotation matrix that is equal to the identity matrix I. The multiplication of a vector and the identity
matrix results in the same vector generating zero perturbation effect on the initial vector. This can be
avoided using the perturbation process correction done in line 9 of Algorithm 2 as explained above.
Algorithm 2 P 2RoCAl for Static Datasets
Inputs :
D ← original dataset with m tuples and n attributes
k ← number of groups/clusters (flag = 1)
or
k′ ← number of tuples/instances in one cluster/group (flag = 0)
Outputs:
Dp ← perturbed dataset
1: conduct clustering/grouping on the dataset using Algorithm 1
2: for each group/cluster Gi do
3: generate C(Gi)
4: if ithgroupsize > 1 then
5: C(Gi) = P (Gi)×∆(Gi)× P (Gi)T
6: generate RP (Gi) using random column shuffle
7: Dp(Gi) = (RP (Gi)×D(Gi)T )T
8: else
9: choose the last rotation matrix, RP (Gl) of the group
with number of tuples greater than 2
10: Dp(Gi) = (RP (Gl)×D(Gi)T )T
11: end if
12: end for
13: Dp = merge(Dp(G1), D
p(G2), . . . , D
p(Gn))
14: randomly swap the tuples of Dp
15: release Dp
End Algorithm
3.2. Algorithm for data streams
In the case of data streams, the algorithm accepts a buffer size of l and a threshold (t) for data
release where t is the number of data chunks of size l to be released before the data stream is paused or
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stopped as denoted in Algorithm 3 and Figure 3. The algorithm assumes that the minimum group size
is two tuples, that is, the constraint of l < 2× k is imposed. This constraint is to avoid the possibility
of ending up with k number of groups where some groups will have one tuple, and some groups will
have none.
Accept the input values k or k′
and t threshold for data release
(t is the number of data chunks of size l to be released)
Accept l number of tuples from the data stream
(l the buffer size where, l > 2× k)
Conduct the clustering process
according to Algorithm 1
Generate covariance matrices of each group C(Gi)
Determine the eigenvectors of each covariance matrix by decomposing
C(Gi) in the following form: C(Gi) = P (Gi)×∆(Gi)× P (Gi)T
Generate RP (Gi) using random column shuffle
Multiply the records in each group
using the corresponding reordered RP (Gi) of that group
Merge the rotated groups
Shuffle the tuples of the dataset (of size l)
Buffer the perturbed group (of size l)
Release the merged dataset of size t× l when the threshold t is reached
Repeat until the
data stream is
stopped/paused
Figure 3: Perturbation algorithm for a data stream
Data streams often grow ad infinitum incrementally. This makes the process of privacy preservation
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complex. To reduce the complexity in the dynamic setting, a data buffer of size l is dynamically
maintained, as shown in Algorithm 3. This data buffer of size l enables generating clusters with better
homogeneity (due to the static nature of clustering). As the algorithm executes, it will accept and
buffer l number of tuples and conduct the perturbation of the buffered data. After perturbation, the
buffered perturbed data is released and merged into the current data chunk, and the buffer can accept
the next set of l tuples. Having a threshold of t avoids the possibility of waiting for a data release for
an unlimited amount of time.
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Algorithm 3 P 2RoCAl for Data Streams
Inputs :
D ← original dataset stream with n attributes
l ← data buffer size
t ← threshold for data release (number of data chunks of size l to be released
before the data stream stops)
k ← number of groups/clusters (flag = 1)
or
k′ ← number of tuples/instances in one cluster/group (flag = 0)
Outputs:
Dp ← perturbed dataset
1: rep=0
2: if l < 2× k then
3: stop
4: end if
5: repeat
6: receive l number of tuples from the data stream
7: rep=rep+1
8: conduct clustering/grouping on the dataset using Algorithm 1
9: for each group/cluster Gi do
10: generate C(Gi)
11: if ithgroupsize > 1 then
12: C(Gi) = P (Gi)×∆(Gi)× P (Gi)T
13: generate RP (Gi) using random column shuffle
14: Dp(Gi) = (RP (Gi)×D(Gi)T )T
15: else
16: choose the last rotation matrix, RP (Gl) of the group
with number of tuples greater than 2
17: Dp(Gi) = (RP (Gl)×D(Gi)T )T
18: end if
19: end for
20: Dprep = merge(D
p(G1), D
p(G2), . . . , D
p(Gn))
21: if rep==t then
22: Dp = merge(Dp1 , D
p
2 , . . . , D
p
t )
23: randomly swap the tuple of Dp
24: release Dp
25: rep=0
26: end if
27: until the data stream is stopped or paused
End Algorithm
3.3. Variations of the proposed algorithm
The proposed algorithm is configurable and allows the use of different settings. Four versions of
the proposed algorithm were derived: two for static datasets (static setting) and two for data streams
(dynamic setting). The version for static data achieves better results than existing schemes. The
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version for streams offers a solution for a new, emerging problem that has not received sufficient
research interest so far. Brief descriptions of the algorithms are provided in Table 1. The variations
were evaluated and compared for their accuracy and security against privacy attacks (more details are
available in Section 4).
Table 1: Variations/Derivations of the proposed algorithm
Algorithm Description/Application
P 2RoCAl The umbrella concept (Privacy Preserving Rotation based Condensation Algorithm)
which represents all its derivatives, given in the following rows of this table.
k′ − P 2RoCAl k′ − P 2RoCAl algorithm was used for the static data perturbation where k′ represents
the group size, and the grouping is done using Algorithm 1. This algorithm was tested
with different settings under different experiments. Therefore, the corresponding settings
of k′ − P 2RoCAl are provided under each experiment with different settings.
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans k−P 2RoCAl kmeans algorithm was used for the static data perturbation where grouping
is done using the k−means algorithm and k represents the number of groups. During the
experiments, k was increased from 5 to 35 in successive steps of 5.
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams k′ − P 2RoCAl streams algorithm was used for the stream data perturbation where k′
represents the group size. The grouping is done using Algorithm 1. During the experiments,
k′ was increased from 100 to 500 in successive steps of 100 and the buffer size l was fixed
to 1000.
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams k−P 2RoCAl kmeans streams algorithm was used for the data stream perturbation where
grouping is done using the k −means algorithm and k represents the number of groups.
During the experiments, k was increased from 5 to 35 in successive steps of 5 and the buffer
size l was fixed to 1000.
4. Results
This section first provides information about the experimental setup and the resources used in
the experiments. Then it describes the experimental results for all the four variations/derivations of
P 2RoCAl explained in Table 1, and then we compare the results with rotation perturbation (RP)
and data condensation (DC). RP and DC were selected for comparison because P 2RoCAl inherits
some properties of RP and DC. More specifically, the RP’s distance (between the tuples) preservation
property and DC’s clustering/grouping and efficient data processing properties were effectively used
in P 2RoCAl.
4.1. Experimental Setup
All features were tested on a Windows 7 (Enterprise 64-bit, Build 7601) computer with an Intel(R)
i7-4790 (4th generation) CPU (8 core, 3.60 GHz) and 8192 MB RAM. The scalability of the proposed
algorithm was tested using a Linux (SUSE Enterprise Server 11 SP4) SGI UV3000 supercomputer, with
64 Intel Haswell 10-core processors, 25MB cache and 8TB of global shared memory connected by SGI’s
NUMAlink interconnect. The algorithm was implemented in MATLAB R2016b. Data classification
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tests were carried out by using Weka 3.6 [59] which is a collection of machine learning algorithms for
data mining tasks.
4.1.1. Datasets used for testing and comparison
The datasets used for performance testing have different dimensions and vary from small to large,
and contain only numerical attributes apart from the class attribute. A short description of the seven
datasets used for testing is given in Table 2. The efficiency of the algorithms for the data stream
case (k′ − P 2RoCAl streams and k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams ) is very closely related to that
of the static case, as we use a buffer size (l) in the case of data streams. To test the performance
of k′ − P 2RoCAl streams and k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams for the data stream case, the same
datasets which are shown in Table 2 were used with the dynamic settings of Algorithm 3.
Table 2: Short descriptions of the datasets selected for testing
Dataset Abbreviation Number
of
Records
Number
of
Attributes
Number
of
Classes
Winequality2 WQDS 4898 11 7
Page Blocks3 PBDS 5473 11 5
Epileptic Seizure 4 ESDS 11500 179 5
Fried5 FRDS 40769 11 2
Statlog6 SSDS 43501 10 5
Hepmass7 HPDS 3310816 28 2
Higgs8 HIDS 11000000 28 2
4.1.2. Classification algorithms used for testing and comparison
First, the dynamics of classification accuracy of P 2RoCAl were measured and compared with the
results of data condensation (DC) using a k-nearest neighbor (kNN) [59] classification approach (for
k=1). As different classes of classification algorithms employ different classification strategies [60],
the classification accuracy of our methods were tested and compared against four more classification
algorithms, namely: decision table [59], naive Bayes [59], random tree [59] and J48 [61]. Decision
table builds a decision table majority classifier. Naive Bayes is a fast classification algorithm based on
probabilistic classifiers. Random tree constructs a tree that considers K randomly chosen attributes
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wholesale+customers
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Page+Blocks+Classification
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Epileptic+Seizure+Recognition
5https://www.openml.org/d/901
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+%28Shuttle%29
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HEPMASS
8https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HIGGS
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at each node while performing no pruning. J48 is an implementation of the decision tree based
classification algorithm [59].
4.2. Performance Evaluation of the Perturbation Algorithm
Performance evaluation was focused on three factors: classification accuracy, attack resilience,
and time consumption. The results were compared with the results obtained from random rotation
perturbation (RP) [13] and data condensation (DC) [16]. Seven datasets (Table 2) were used to test and
compare the proposed algorithm and its derivations (Table 1). The datasets perturbed by P 2RoCAl
were tested for classification accuracy using the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classification algorithm
where the value of k for kNN was maintained at a constant of 1 throughout all the experiments. kNN
is a non-parametric method used for classification [59]. The original datasets were perturbed using RP
and DC also, and the classification accuracy results were compared. The comparisons were conducted
using the nonparametric statistical comparison test, Friedman’s rank test, which is analogous to a
standard one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance [62]. Friedman’s mean ranks (FMR) and the
statistical significance of the results were recorded.
The resilience of the method was tested against three attack types, to which the proposed method
is most vulnerable. Section 4.2.2 provides a detailed description of the three attack types. P 2RoCAl’s
attack resilience results were compared with RP and DC using Friedman’s rank test, and the results
were presented with the corresponding test statistics.
Runtime complexity of P 2RoCAl was evaluated, and then time consumption experiments were run
on the ESDS dataset to check the effect of the number of tuples and number of attributes on the time
consumption. The ESDS dataset was specially selected for this analysis as it has a high number of
attributes (Table 2). Next, the running times of DC, RP, k′−P 2RoCAl and k−P 2RoCAl kmeans were
measured for the four datasets, PBDS, WQDS, FRDS, and FRDS. The results were then compared
with each other using Friedman’s rank test.
4.2.1. Classification Accuracy
Figure 4 shows the average classification accuracy returned by the kNN classification algorithm
against increasing k′ (the group size) sizes for k′ − P 2RoCAl and DC. Table 3 has the average clas-
sification accuracy values returned by kNN classification algorithm for the original datasets (PBDS,
WQDS, FRDS and SSDS) and the datasets perturbed by k′ − PR2oCAl, RP and DC. The results
were produced with 10-fold cross validation.
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Figure 4: Classification accuracy comparison of the perturbed data for large k′ values
The last column in Table 3 has the Friedman’s test ranks (denoted by FMR) returned for each of
the methods. The test statistics of the experiment had a χ2 value of 14.786, degree of freedom of 6
and a p-value of 0.022. The p-value suggests that there is a significant difference between the average
accuracies of the datasets. The original dataset has the highest mean rank, as it has the highest
classification accuracy. The mean ranks prove that P 2RoCAl and its variations provide the highest
classification accuracy. Using kNN classification on the four datasets (as given in Table 3), DC returns
the least accurate results, and k − P 2RoCAl kmeans and k′ − P 2RoCAl streams produce the best
results. The results available in Table 3, are further illustrated using a bar graph in Figure 5.
Table 3: Average accuracy returned by the methods on the datasets
Dataset original
accuracy
DC RP k′ − P 2RoCAl k − P 2RoCAl kmeans k′ − P 2RoCAl streams k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams
PBDS 95.87% 88.62% 95.27% 95.23% 95.45% 95.60% 95.58%
WQDS 64.54% 37.34% 50.88% 58% 60.35% 88.01% 87%
FRDS 82.46% 55.71% 58.26% 81.26% 81.84% 73.57% 73%
SSDS 99.94% 80.37% 99.85% 99.70% 99.79% 98.59% 99%
FMR 6.5 1 3.25 3.5 4.75 4.75 4.25
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Figure 5: Average accuracy provided by the methods
Experiments were conducted to investigate the dynamics of classification accuracy for data pro-
duced by the three methods: RP, DC and k′−P 2RoCAl. Table 4 contains the classification accuracies
of the data produced by the three methods along with the original data sets for four classification
algorithms: Decision Table, J48, Naive Bayes and Random Tree.
Table 4: Average classification accuracies on different classification algorithms
Dataset Algorithm Decision Table J48 Naive Bayes Random Tree
WQDS
Original 53.27% 59.82% 44.67% 61.70%
RP 45.75% 46.47% 33.83% 46.71%
DC 45.57% 39.93% 37.85% 36.79%
k′ − P 2RoCAl 44.99% 53.00% 40.55% 57.61%
PBDS
Original 95.63% 96.88% 90.85% 96.05%
RP 93.88% 95.16% 78.46% 94.13%
DC 93.21% 92.48% 71.43% 90.30%
k′ − P 2RoCAl 93.48% 94.46% 39.11% 93.90%
FRDS
Original 83.42% 89.41% 86.53% 86.95%
RP 63.27% 63.32% 66.12% 58.25%
DC 61.09% 61.30% 60.97% 56.15%
k′ − P 2RoCAl 72.58% 77.83% 65.71% 76.25%
SSDS
Original 99.72% 99.96% 91.84% 99.96%
RP 98.36% 99.65% 78.54% 99.60%
DC 83.78% 85.38% 74.09% 80.04%
k′ − P 2RoCAl 95.40% 99.49% 75.26% 99.51%
Figure 6 has the box plots for the data in Table 4. It can be noted that the classification accuracy
result for P 2RoCAl is better than the result for DC and very close to the results for RP.
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Figure 6: Box plots on the data available in Table 4
4.2.2. Attack Resistance
The literature shows different probable attack types against matrix multiplicative data perturbation
[63]. The main purpose of these attacks is to restore the original data from the perturbed data. The
larger the difference between original data and perturbed data, the more difficult the attack becomes.
Figure 7 shows the variation of STD(D−Dp) against increasing k′ for P 2RoCAl and DC. This captures
the variation of the standard deviation of the difference between the original and perturbed data, and
indicates how secure the methods are when using different group sizes (k′).
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Figure 7: Dynamics of STD(D-Dp) against increasing k′ values
P 2RoCAl is based on matrix multiplication, and it was tested against three types of attacks: naive
estimation, accessible/known I/O (assuming 10% of the original data is known to the adversary) and
ICA based attacks. To check the resilience of the proposed algorithm against ICA based attacks, the
procedure described in [13] was employed, and the FastICA package [64] was used to evaluate the
effectiveness of ICA-based reconstruction of the perturbed data. The attack resilience experiments
were inspired by those described in [13, 14], and the results are presented in Table 5. For naive
inference attacks, the standard deviation of the difference between the original data and the perturbed
data (both normalized) was calculated. For ICA and IO, the standard deviation of the difference
between the original and reconstructed data (both normalized) was used. The results returned by RP
were generated using 10 number of iterations with a noise factor (sigma) of 0.3 (the default setting).
The minimum (“min”) values under each test indicate the minimum guarantee of resilience while the
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average (“avg”) values give an impression of overall resilience.
Table 5: Results of the attack resilience experiments
Dataset Algorithm NImin NIavg ICAmin ICAavg IOmin IOavg
PBDS
DC 0.0940 0.1975 0.5595 0.6937 0.2507 0.5278
RP 0.1022 0.3214 0.5883 0.7444 0.0002 0.1446
k′ − P 2RoCAl 0.7977 0.9550 0.7009 0.7075 0.6892 0.7046
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans 0.3901 0.6182 0.7006 0.7071 0.6961 0.7052
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams 0.5436 0.7633 0.6873 0.7067 0.6702 0.7008
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams 0.6509 0.8052 0.6938 0.7076 0.6848 0.7016
WQDS
DC 0.0278 0.0652 0.5640 0.6938 0.1077 0.5762
RP 0.0338 0.1090 0.6272 0.6840 0.0057 0.4063
k′ − P 2RoCAl 0.4030 0.8199 0.6993 0.7072 0.6914 0.7038
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans 0.4030 0.8199 0.6993 0.7072 0.6914 0.7038
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams 0.4083 0.7928 0.6734 0.7074 0.6319 0.6945
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams 0.4808 0.8921 0.6867 0.7038 0.6598 0.6972
SSDS
DC 0.2493 0.4116 0.6374 0.7243 0.3895 0.5709
RP 0.1994 0.3904 0.4781 0.7116 0.0019 0.0357
k′ − P 2RoCAl 0.7076 0.9250 0.7047 0.7070 0.7023 0.7062
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans 0.4961 0.7221 0.7040 0.7067 0.7032 0.7063
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams 0.8386 0.9615 0.7035 0.7065 0.7017 0.7056
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams 0.8391 0.9837 0.7054 0.7071 0.7006 0.7053
FRDS
DC 0.9434 1.0966 0.6181 0.7041 0.5686 0.6167
RP 0.9309 1.0093 0.4847 0.6948 0.3956 0.5076
k′ − P 2RoCAl 1.1761 1.2963 0.7049 0.7072 0.7016 0.7063
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans 1.1895 1.3131 0.7051 0.7074 0.7015 0.7062
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams 1.2897 1.3375 0.7043 0.7071 0.7011 0.7059
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams 1.3153 1.3368 0.7046 0.7072 0.7012 0.7062
The mean ranks produced by Friedman’s rank test on the data available in Table 5 are presented in
Table 6, with the test statistics: a χ2 value of 47.5694, a degree of freedom of 5 and a p-value of 4.3485e-
09. Table 5 includes the standard deviation of the difference between original data and reconstructed
data, except for naive inference, where the difference between original data and perturbed data is used.
Here, a higher rank indicates better resilience. According to the p-value, the attack resilience rank
averages of the six methods are significantly different. The mean ranks suggest that all the variations
of the new method provide comparatively higher security against the privacy attacks and that DC
provides the lowest level of resilience against the investigated attack methods.
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Table 6: Friedman test ranks on the attack resilience data
Method Mean Rank
DC 10.7917
RP 9.3333
k′ − P 2RoCAl 24.4167
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans 21.5417
k′ − P 2RoCAl streams 21.7917
k − P 2RoCAl Kmeans streams 23.1250
4.2.3. Time complexity
Algorithm 2 has three main components that affect computational complexity: (i) clustering/-
grouping process (line 1, Algorithm 2), (ii) generating a rotation matrix for the rotation perturbation
(line 5, Algorithm 2), and (iii) rotation perturbation on the groups (line 7 or 10, Algorithm 2). The
first component has two ways to achieve the grouping, which is demonstrated in Algorithm 1. If the
grouping is done using the k-means algorithm, the complexity would be O(k ×m× n× I) where I is
the number of iterations. If the user chooses k′ as the option, then the clustering complexity would
be O(k′ × m × (m/k′) × n) = O(m2 × n) as the algorithm tries to select the closest k′ − 1 tuples
per each randomly sampled tuple (Xi) from the dataset D for m/k
′ number of iterations. For the
second component, the algorithm first needs to conduct the eigenvalue decomposition, which has a
computation complexity of O(n3). Next, the algorithm conducts the rotation perturbation, which has
a computational complexity of O(m × n3). Figure 8 shows the time consumption of k′ − P 2RoCAl
and k−P 2RoCAl kmeans against changing the number of tuples and attributes of the ESDS dataset;
when one was changing, the other was kept constant. During the time consumption analysis, k′ was
maintained as constant at 1000 while k was set to 10. As shown in Figure 8a and 8c, when the number
of tuples is increased while the number of attributes is kept constant, the runtime complexity is gov-
erned by clustering. Hence the complexity is O(k×m×I) if the user’s choice is k, while the complexity
is O(m2) when the user’s choice of k′. When the number of tuples is maintained as constant, the worst
case complexity of the algorithm becomes O(n3), but the plots Figure 8b and 8d still show a pattern
close to linear. This suggests that the effect of attributes is considerably low since m >>> n. Hence,
the overall complexity is mainly governed by the number of tuples.
Table 7 shows the time consumption of DC, RP, k′−P 2RoCAl and k−P 2RoCAl kmeans for the
perturbation of the four datasets: PBDS, WQDS, FRDS, and SSDS. The mean ranks produced by
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Figure 8: Time consumption patterns of P 2RoCAl
Friedman’s rank test on the data in Table 7 are presented in the last row. The experiment returns the
test statistics: a (χ2 value) of 8.4, a degree of freedom of 3 and a p-value of 0.038. Here, lower ranks
suggest that the time consumption of the corresponding method is low compared to other methods.
Table 7: Runtime analysis of the perturbation process consumed by the algorithms
Dataset DC/s RP/s k′ − P 2RoCAl/s k − P 2RoCAl kmeans/s
PBDS 0.3421 1590.7000 0.3800 0.7462
WQDS 0.3022 217.0409 0.3439 0.9744
FRDS 2.4543 1807.6000 2.5760 1.1300
SSDS 2.7134 1269.6000 2.6830 4.2508
FMR 1.50 4.00 2.00 2.50
24
According to the Friedman’s rank test, it can be noted that DC consumes the lowest amount of
time while RP consumes the highest amount of time for perturbation. But, the values in Table 7
further suggest that DC and k′ − P 2RoCAl lie close to each other in terms of time consumption by
the perturbation process.
4.3. Scalability
The scalability analysis was conducted using an SGI UV3000 supercomputer (see details in section
4.1). The results of scalability experiments with two extremely large datasets (HPDS and HIDS) are
given in Table 8. The times to perturb these datasets, having more than 3 million and 11 million
records respectively, are shown in the table. As can be seen, RP didn’t converge even after 100 hours.
Table 8: Scalability results (in seconds) of the three methods for high dimensional data
Dataset RP DC (k=1000) DC (k=10000) k′ − P 2RoCAl (k′=1000) k′ − P 2RoCAl (k′=10000)
HPDS NC within 100h 5.34E+03 526.1168 4.61E+03 657.7576
HIDS NC within 100h 6.95E+04 6.42E+03 1.36E+05 7.28E+03
9NC: Did not converge
5. Discussion
In this paper a new data perturbation method (P 2RoCAl) was introduced which can be used for
both static data and stream data privacy preservation. The proposed method, P 2RoCAl is mainly
based on two data perturbation methods: data condensation (DC) and rotation perturbation (RP).
Though DC can be used for both static data and stream data processing, RP can only be used for
static data processing. Due to RP preserving the distance between tuples, it often provides good
accuracy in data clustering and classification. However, RP is not cost-effective in terms of computer
processing. DC, on the other hand, is a fast privacy preservation algorithm which is capable of efficient
data stream processing, but its synthetic data generation often decreases the quality of data when it is
configured to provide high data privacy. If DC is used under its settings to provide high data privacy
(with a larger spatial locality), it often ends up in generating datasets with reduced accuracy. A better
method for both static and stream data processing, P 2RoCAl combines the advantages of DC and
RP: high efficiency and high accuracy.
It was noticeable that P 2RoCAl shows increasing accuracy while DC shows decreasing accuracy
against an increasing k′ value. Especially when the datasets are large (i.e. larger group/cluster
sizes and larger spatial locality), we cannot expect good classification accuracy from DC. To have no
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substantial loss of accuracy, DC assumes that the data is uniformly distributed and has small spacial
locality. This leads to reduced privacy, as the distribution of the condensed data is very close to
that of original data. As shown in Figure 4 and Figure 7, it is noticeable that with increasing k′
the accuracy of DC decreases while the std(D − Dp) increases. So, it is clear that for small group
sizes, DC provides a higher accuracy while providing lower privacy which is evident from the further
analysis on attack resilience, as shown in Table 5. In fact, the results available in Table 5 and Table 6
further prove that all four derivations of P 2RoCAl provide higher attack resilience than both DC and
RP. This proves that DC cannot maintain the balance between privacy and utility on an acceptable
level under a single point of convergence. P 2RoCAl shows the opposite effect, where for smaller k′
values, it provides higher privacy while providing an accuracy greater than that of DC. This is due
to the fact that, as the group size gets smaller, it forms a large number of groups. Therefore, the
effect of rotation perturbation with the result of many different angles is greater on the dataset. Since
rotation does not distort the distances between tuples, accuracy is not affected. As a result, P 2RoCAl
provides better classification accuracy while providing a higher level of deviation of perturbed data
from the original data (refer to Figure 4 and Figure 7). This feature of P 2RoCAl is essential for data
stream perturbation since we have to perform on-demand data perturbation of infinite streams. When
perturbing data streams, the resulting number of groups can become unlimited, yet the privacy and
accuracy is well preserved by P 2RoCAl.
From Table 3 and Figure 5 it is apparent that introducing the k-means algorithm for clustering
improves the accuracy of the perturbed dataset. At the same time, k-means decreases the efficiency
slightly (see Table 7), and resilience suffers (refer Tables 5 and 6). This is due to the fact that k-means
algorithm improves the homogeneity of the clusters which results in better accuracy. Since the cluster
sizes are different (e.g. some may have even one tuple), perturbation tends to have slightly less effect.
According to Table 3 and Figure 5, the derivations of P 2RoCAl provide better accuracy than
both DC and RP as reflected in the FMR values shown in the last column of Table 3. So we can
say that P 2RoCAl provides better accuracy for both static and stream cases, than DC and RP. It
can be observed that in the static case of data perturbation, k′ − P 2RoCAl kmeans provides better
accuracy compared to that of k′ − P 2RoCAl. This is because of the increased homogeneity of the
groups, which results from k−P 2RoCAl kmeans. In k−P 2RoCAl kmeans, the number of resulting
groups is controlled by the parameter k. The size of a particular group is not constant; it uses
k − means clustering for grouping. This can result in groups with different sizes, but with higher
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homogeneity. In k′ − P 2RoCAl, we control the parameter k′, i.e., the group size so that all groups
will have a constant number of tuples. Therefore, the groups produced in k′ − P 2RoCAl, might not
be as homogeneous as in k − P 2RoCAl kmeans. As a result of that, k − P 2RoCAl kmeans tends to
provide better accuracy. When the method is applied to streams, both k′ − P 2RoCAl streams and
k − P 2RoCAl kmeans streams seem to provide similar accuracy. This is due to the fact that initial
clustering is performed upon the buffered data chunks that are small in size when compared to the
main dataset D. The small changes in homogeneity will not make a significant impact in changing the
accuracy of the final dataset.
Table 4 and Figure 6 show the dynamics of classification accuracy for different classification algo-
rithms and different datasets. According to Figure 6, k′ − P 2RoCAl provides better accuracy than
DC in most cases. It can also be noted that the accuracy provided by k′ − P 2RoCAl is less than that
of RP. This is how k′ − P 2RoCAl’s multiple rotation perturbations affect the dataset, whereas RP
imposes a single perturbation on the whole dataset. As RP is not capable of data stream perturbation,
P 2RoCAl can be considered a superior solution.
The time complexity analysis of the proposed algorithm shows that P 2RoCAl’s computational
complexity is governed by the clustering component. As the number of attributes and tuples increase,
the time complexity of the perturbation algorithm will also increase. Conventionally a data stream
grows incrementally where new tuples are rapidly added to the dataset while the number of attributes
remains constant. Therefore, we can consider an inequality between m and n as m >>> n where n is
small compared to an extremely larger number of m. This suggests that the number of tuples has a
higher contribution to the time complexity. But, the empirical data on time consumption show that
PR2CAl consumes reasonably low amounts of time and the plots (refer Figure 8) on time consumption
show patterns close to linear. The very low time consumption of the perturbation process compared
to RP was shown in Table 7. This further underlines the suitability of P 2RoCAl for fast data streams.
Scalability results available in Table 8 prove that the proposed algorithm is capable of perturbing big
datasets that have extreme dimensions.
5.1. Selecting values for k/k′
We can apply logical reasoning for the selection of suitable values for k/k′ by looking at the results
of P 2RoCAl on different datasets. There is a relative dependency between l and k/k′. The selection
of these two input parameters is highly dependent on the speed of a particular data stream. The faster
the data stream (e.g. 4000 tuples per second) , the lower the l value (e.g. 1000). Hence k′ needs to
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be higher (e.g. 200) (or k needs to be lower (e.g. 5)). When the speed of the data stream is relatively
slower (60 tuples per second), the vice-versa of the above scenario applies, where l can be relatively
higher (e.g. 4000) while k′=100 (or k=40). But, the selection of specific values for these parameters
will not have an extensive effect on the privacy and utility of P 2RoCAl (which is evident in Figures 4
and 7), rather, it will affect the efficiency of the method.
5.2. Real life application of P 2RoCAl: Application Vs. Constraints
Application of privacy-preserving methods in real-world scenarios involves specific constraints.
Most of the applications need attention to particular adaptations. For example, Marcelo Luiz Bro-
cardo et al. discuss how privacy can be imposed over a real world application: a positive credit system.
They propose a cryptographic protocol to share private information about customers and companies to
produce credit profiles [65]. The proposed version of P 2RoCAl is designed to perturb only numerical
data, and real-life applications of P 2RoCAl are limited to numerical big data sets and data streams.
Most of the existing IoT sensors (e.g. temperature sensors, proximity sensors, pressure sensors, chem-
ical sensors, IR sensors, etc.) produce numerical data resulting in numerical big data. This enables
P 2RoCAl to be applied to many applications, including, but not limited to, healthcare, financial, social
networking, weather, marketing. Some real-world IoT stream examples that P 2RoCAl is applicable
to, include Sense your City (CITY) and NYC Taxi cab (TAXI) [66]. Sense your City (CITY) is an
urban environmental monitoring project that has used crowd-sourcing to deploy sensors at 7 cities
across 3 continents in 2015, with about 12 sensors per city, emits 7000 messages/ sec. NYC Taxi
cab (TAXI) offers a stream of smart transportation messages that arrive from 2M trips taken in 2013
on 20, 355 New York city taxis equipped with GPS emits 4000 messages/ sec. Empirical analysis of
P 2RoCAl shows that the perturbation explicitly preserves the classification properties of the original
data. Therefore, the proposed method is best utilized for privacy-preserving data classification.
5.3. Future directions
The proposed algorithm can be configured via different permutations of settings. Part of the
algorithm configuration was explained in Section 3.3. P 2RoCAl configuration can also be changed
with the two other factors: the distance measure for homogeneous clustering and the method used for
the matrix decomposition (Equation 1). We have the possibility of using several distance measurements
for the random data grouping method as well as for k−means clustering. As the proposed algorithm
can be used for any numerical dataset, we should avoid using binary distance measurements such
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as ”hamming distance” [67]. The results provided in this paper are based on P 2RoCAl that uses
Euclidean distance [68] as the distance measure. Some other distance measurements that can be
effectively used with P 2RoCAl are City block distance [68], Cosine distance [68] and Correlation [68].
P 2RoCAl uses eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix generated by each group. Other
decomposition methods, such as singular value decomposition, polar decomposition, etc. can also be
used to generate the rotation matrix of a particular group, as long as the decomposition generates a
sub-matrix that has the properties of a rotational matrix. Further studies on increasing the efficiency
of P 2RoCAl using sampling techniques and parallel implementations can be investigated. This would
allow P 2RoCAl to work with high-speed data streams.
6. Conclusion
A new data stream perturbation algorithm (P 2RoCAl) was introduced. It provides higher accuracy,
efficiency and attack resilience than similar methods. It was shown that the runtime complexity is
governed by clustering when the number of attributes is kept constant. The algorithm shows a worst-
case runtime complexity of O(n3) when the number of tuples is maintained as a constant. As the
number of attributes is very low compared to the number of tuples in many cases, e.g. in data
streams, P 2RoCAl exhibited a considerably lower time consumption during the empirical analyses.
This makes it possible to work with continuously growing data streams and big data. The proposed
method P 2RoCAl showed better classification accuracies than its contenders. P 2RoCAl also shows
higher resilience against the attacks such as naive estimation, I/O attacks, and ICA attacks, compared
to rotation perturbation and data condensation.
In summary, this paper proposed P 2RoCAl, an effective perturbation method for data streams
and big data. One potential application of P 2RoCAl might be the precision health domain where a
large number of IoT devices are or will be used to monitor a persons body, activities, and behaviors.
P 2RoCAl can be used effectively to perturb continuous streams of data generated by sensors moni-
toring an individual or group of individuals before the data is transmitted to cloud systems for further
analysis.
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